

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF SOCIETY ON INSTAGRAM SOCIAL MEDIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE #RESETINDONESIA (17+8) MOVEMENT IN 2025

Raisha Maulidza ^{a*)}, Anwar Ilmar ^{a)}

^{a)} Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta, Jakarta, Indonesia

^{*)}Corresponding Author: raishamldz245@gmail.com

Article history: received 19 May 2026; revised May 26, 2026; accepted 29 June 2026

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33751/jhss.v10i2.194>

Abstract. This study aims to analyze the forms and processes of political participation mobilization on Instagram through the #ResetIndonesia movement in 2025. The research employs a qualitative approach with a case study design that combines netnography and in-depth interviews. Netnographic data were collected through the analysis of 30 Instagram posts tagged with #ResetIndonesia, while semi-structured interviews were conducted with six informants, consisting of two movement initiators, two hybrid participants, and two online participants. The findings indicate that the most dominant forms of participation were expressions of political dissatisfaction, political satire, and political criticism through comments, content sharing, and Instagram Stories. The mobilization process occurred through the strategic deployment of five resources: technological, network, symbolic, organizational, and human resources, as explained in Tilly's (1978) Resource Mobilization Theory. The main finding shows that the transition from digital participation to offline collective action does not occur automatically but is mediated by the availability of community and organizational networks beyond the platform. Theoretically, this study extends the hybrid participation framework proposed by Gibson and Cantijoch (2013) by adding a structural dimension, arguing that the hybridity of participation is determined by the availability of social networks rather than solely by platform technology.

Keywords: #ResetIndonesia, Politic participation, digital mobilization, Insta gram

I. INTRODUCTION

Political participation has undergone a fundamental shift in the digital era. Conventionally, political participation was understood through activities such as elections, party membership, and demonstrations, forms of engagement that required investments of time, physical presence, and access to organizational networks that not everyone possessed. The emergence of social media platforms has dramatically reduced these barriers, creating new opportunities for collective identity formation and making political expression more accessible to broader segments of society [16], while Earl and Kimport [17] suggest that digital activism has introduced new forms of organization in which decentralized online networks can perform functions previously carried out by formal organizations. Today, expressing political opinions, disseminating demands, or supporting a movement requires only a device and an internet connection, making political participation accessible to groups that previously had limited access to conventional political arenas. This shift not only broadens who can participate but also transforms how political pressure is built, how quickly it spreads, and how far its reach extends as a dynamic that is increasingly visible in hashtag-based social movements across the globe, including the 2019 Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Movement [8], and

various other digital political movements in different national contexts.




fig 1. Line Chart of Instagram Users in Indonesia Based on Data from NapoleonCat (2025) and DataReportal (2025)

Among the various social media platforms available, Instagram occupies the most strategic position in the context of political mobilization in Indonesia [10]. Structurally, Indonesia is one of the countries with the largest number of Instagram users in the world, with active users reaching 100.8 million in 2025 [11] and 108 million by the end of the same year based on Meta advertising data [12][27] (see Figure 1).

This large user base creates structural conditions that are favorable for political mobilization. As a result, messages uploaded on Instagram have the potential to reach a much broader audience than could be achieved even through physical demonstrations. This condition is reinforced by the platform's technical affordances, which specifically support the mass dissemination of visual content [20]. Features such as Reels, Stories, and the repost function allow political content to spread exponentially through user networks, unlike text-based platforms such as X, which have limitations in terms of visual format. At a more specific level, Instagram's strength as a space for political mobilization is further reinforced by the presence of influencer networks with large followings.

It is within this context that the #ResetIndonesia movement in 2025 emerged as an academically significant case to examine. The movement arose as a public response to the policy of increasing DPR members' housing allowances by 50 million rupiah per month, a policy that triggered a wave of expressions of dissatisfaction on Instagram even before an organized hashtag had been formed [2][1]. eventually leading to street protests on August 25, 2025 [3]. What distinguishes this movement from previous digital movements in Indonesia is its mobilization structure. The hashtag #ResetIndonesia subsequently emerged as a new platform for political expression, marking the transition from street protests to more organized digital mobilization [4]. Rather than being driven by activists, civil society organizations, or formal political actors, #ResetIndonesia was predominantly mobilized by non-political figures such as musicians, content creators, and entertainment personalities whose primary bases were not within the political arena. non-political actor is the one who organized offline demonstrations on September 1, 2025, voicing the 17+8 demands that had previously circulated online [7]. This phenomenon directly challenges the conventional assumption that effective political mobilization requires actors with formal political backgrounds and raises new questions about how symbolic resources and digital networks can substitute for traditional organizational infrastructures [5].

allowances. Rather, it also included a range of other political and social demands [14]. The post successfully generated 9 million views, a reach that would be structurally impossible to achieve through physical demonstrations alone and reflects the comparative advantage of digital platforms in amplifying political messages. Furthermore, the movement generated a measurable institutional response. The official Instagram account of the DPR RI (@dpr_ri) published an official post on September 5, 2025, responding to the 17+8 demands that had circulated digitally [30][31]. This fact makes #ResetIndonesia not merely a viral phenomenon, but empirical evidence that digital political participation can generate sufficient pressure to encourage responses from state institutions. This represents a finding with important implications for understanding digital democracy in Indonesia.

Several previous studies have examined hashtag-based political mobilization on Indonesian social media, but with different focuses and platforms from this study. Ulya and Indainanto [21] found that the #TolakRUUKesehatan movement on Twitter was driven by opinion leaders such as health activists and professional organizations, who played a role in shaping public opinion regarding government policies through digital network analysis. Meanwhile, Bahriansyah et al. [22] examined the mobilization of Generation Z political participation in the Indonesia Gelap Action 2025 and found that social media algorithms served as the primary driver of public engagement, although the resulting participation tended to be reactive and unsustainable. Both studies provide important contributions to understanding the dynamics of digital mobilization in Indonesia. however, they also have limitations that create opportunities for further research. First, both studies focus on Twitter or are not specific to a single platform, and therefore do not examine how Instagram's visual affordances, such as Reels, Stories, and templates, create mobilization mechanisms that are qualitatively different from text-based platforms. Second, the mobilizing actors in both studies were activists, formal organizations, or algorithms rather than non-political public figures, as occurred in #ResetIndonesia. Third, neither study explored the relationship between digital mobilization and institutional responses from state institutions as an indicator of measurable political impact.

Based on the literature review above, there is a significant research gap that remains inadequately addressed. Specifically, three gaps can be identified. First, no study has specifically examined Instagram, including features such as Reels, Stories, and shareable templates, as a platform for political mobilization in the Indonesian context, where the platform has the fourth-largest user base in the world. Second, the role of non-political public figures as primary mobilization actors has not been adequately theorized within the Resource Mobilization Theory framework, even though this phenomenon is increasingly common in contemporary platform-based social movements. Third, the relationship between digital mobilization and formal institutional responses, particularly how online pressure can generate recognition from state institutions, has not been empirically explored in the context of Indonesian social movements. These three gaps are not merely technical shortcomings in the



fig 2. Post About the 17+8 Demands Through the Instagram Account @realityclub

In the figure above, the post takes the form of an Instagram carousel uploaded by the Instagram account @realityclub, containing the 17+8 public demands. The content of these demands was not limited to opposition to the increase in DPR

literature but reflect a deeper conceptual limitation in understanding how digital political participation operates in the platform era, where the boundaries between entertainment and politics, and between digital spaces and formal institutions, are becoming increasingly blurred.

In this study, Charles Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory is employed as the primary theoretical framework to examine how technological, network, symbolic, organizational, and human resources were strategically mobilized within the #ResetIndonesia movement. This framework is complemented by two supporting concepts. The first is digital political participation proposed by Theocharis and van Deth [18], which is used to identify the concrete forms of participation that emerged on Instagram. The second is the concept of hybrid political participation developed by Gibson and Cantijoch (2013), which is used to analyze the relationship between online engagement and offline collective action.

This study seeks to address these three gaps simultaneously by examining the #ResetIndonesia movement as a case that uniquely combines mobilization by non-political actors, the affordances of a visual platform, and measurable institutional responses within a single phenomenon that can be analyzed cohesively. Based on this context, the study poses the following research question: How do the forms and processes of political participation mobilization occur on Instagram through the #ResetIndonesia movement in 2025? Therefore, this study aims to analyze the forms of public political participation on Instagram within the #ResetIndonesia movement and to examine the process through which political mobilization occurs in both digital and offline spaces.

II. RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach with a case study design to examine the forms and processes of political participation mobilization through the #ResetIndonesia movement on Instagram in 2025. Qualitative research is an approach used to explore and understand the meanings individuals or groups attach to social phenomena [28]. According to Creswell and Creswell [23], a case study is an appropriate approach for investigating contemporary phenomena within their real-life contexts, particularly when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context cannot be clearly separated. The #ResetIndonesia movement meets these criteria because it has clear boundaries in three dimensions: temporal (August–September 2025), issue-based (opposition to the policy of increasing DPR housing allowances), and spatial (Instagram as the primary arena of mobilization).

Data were collected through two complementary techniques, namely netnography and in-depth interviews. Netnography was conducted by observing Instagram content that used the hashtag #ResetIndonesia during the period from August 20 to September 10, 2025, a timeframe that encompassed the initial emergence of the movement through to the institutional response of the DPR RI on September 5, 2025. From all content circulated during this period, 30 pieces of content were selected based on four inclusion criteria:

1) Uploaded by public accounts that could be accessed

without privacy restriction,

2) Contained content that was substantively relevant to the #ResetIndonesia issue and not merely the use of the hashtag without context,

3) Published within the predetermined observation period,

4) Had a significant level of engagement.

This was measured through a combination of the number of likes, comments, and views as indicators of the content's relevance and public resonance. Content that met all four criteria included various post formats, including photos, videos, Reels, and carousels, to ensure the representation of different forms of digital expression within the movement [24].

The coding process was conducted manually, with the researcher systematically reviewing each piece of content and annotating recurring themes before consolidating them into broader categories. This manual approach was considered appropriate given the relatively small corpus of 30 posts and the interpretive nature of the analysis, which required careful examination of visual and textual elements that might not be adequately captured by automated tools. This process resulted in seven content categories: political dissatisfaction/public anger, political documentation, political satire, political criticism, public mobilization, political education, and organizational consolidation. An inductive approach was chosen because it allowed categories to emerge from the characteristics of the data itself, rather than imposing a predetermined categorization framework, a principle that is consistent with the spirit of netnography as a method sensitive to specific digital cultural contexts [29].

To complement the netnographic data, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with six informants selected through purposive sampling based on their involvement in and knowledge of the #ResetIndonesia movement [23]. While Earl and Kimport [17] suggest that digital activism has introduced new forms of organization in which decentralized online networks can perform functions previously carried out by formal organizations. The informants consisted of two movement initiators, two hybrid participants who were involved both online and offline, and two online participants. Informants were recruited through three channels: direct contact via Instagram direct messages, coordination through managers for informants who were public figures, and the researcher's personal network of individuals involved in the movement. The interviews were conducted in a mixed format, with some carried out face-to-face and others online, with an average duration of 15 minutes per session. All interviews were audio-recorded with the informants' consent and subsequently transcribed verbatim for analysis purposes.

Before the interviews were conducted, the researcher explained the purpose of the study, how the data would be used, that participants' identities would remain confidential, and that the sessions would be recorded. Verbal consent was obtained from all informants before recording began, in accordance with the principles of qualitative research ethics [23][25]. To protect informants' privacy, the identities of all participants were anonymized and replaced with specific codes, as presented in Table 1.

TABLE I
RESEARCH INFORMANTS PROFILE

Code	Categories	Gender	Involvement
I-1	initiator	woman	initiator & coordinator of the #ResetIndonesia Movement
I-2	initiator	man	content manager & instagram distribution strategy coordinator
H-1	hybrid Participation	man	participated online & joined offline actions
H-2	hybrid Participation	man	participated online & joined offline actions
O-1	online participation	woman	participated through comments, shares, & instagram stories
O-2	online participation	man	participated through comments, shares, & instagram stories

Data analysis followed the interactive model of Miles and Huberman [26], which consists of four stages: data collection, data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. During the reduction stage, data from interviews and netnography were filtered to select the information most relevant to the research question. The reduced data were then presented in the form of descriptive-analytical narratives that organized the findings according to the identified categories. To ensure data validity, this study applied source triangulation by comparing interview data with netnographic findings, technique triangulation by verifying informants' claims through digital observation, and time triangulation by rechecking data at different points in time throughout the research period [23].

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The following discussion uses Charles Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory [15] as the primary analytical framework to examine both the forms and processes of political participation mobilization in the #ResetIndonesia movement on Instagram. Resource Mobilization Theory serves as the main theoretical framework in this study because it helps explain how collective action is organized and sustained. The theory is particularly relevant for examining how different resources, including social networks, digital platforms, and public figures, contributed to the development of the #ResetIndonesia movement. To support the analysis, this study also draws on the concepts of digital political participation proposed by Theocharis and van Deth [18] and hybrid political participation developed by Gibson and Cantijoch [19]. The first concept is used to identify the forms of political participation that appeared on Instagram, while the second helps explain the relationship between online engagement and offline collective action. By combining these perspectives, the study is able to examine both the forms of participation that emerged and the processes through which the movement developed and expanded.

A. Forms of Public Participation on Instagram

TABLE 2
NETHNOGRAPHY RESEARCH FINDINGS

No	Category	Total	%	Operational Definition
1	Political Dissatisfaction /Public Anger	14	46.7%	Content expressing frustration, disappointment, or anger toward government policies or political institutions
2	Political Documentation	8	26.7%	Content recording events, protests, or political developments as factual evidence
3	Political Satire	8	26.7%	Content using humor, irony, or creative expression to criticize political conditions
4	Political Criticism	7	23.3%	Content presenting direct analytical or argumentative critique of policies or political actors

The netnographic analysis of 30 Instagram posts tagged with #ResetIndonesia identified the categories of political participation presented in Table 2. The most dominant category was political dissatisfaction/public anger, accounting for 46.7% of all analyzed content. The dominance of this affective expression has important analytical significance, as it indicates that emotional resonance, rather than rational argumentation or formal organizational direction, functions as the primary driver of engagement in this movement. As emphasized by Theocharis and Van Deth [18], this form of participation represents a low-threshold individualized expressive action that does not require substantial resources but has high dissemination potential because it connects with audiences who share similar sentiments.

The interview findings reinforce the understanding of these forms of participation. When asked whether activities such as commenting, sharing content, and posting Instagram Stories constitute political participation, all informants responded affirmatively. "Not everyone affected by government policies can participate directly in street protests. Therefore, criticism and the expression of aspirations on social media are also forms of political participation," stated informant O-1. This statement aligns with Theocharis and Van Deth's [18] conceptualization of online expressive political participation, which recognizes that digital gestures, regardless of how simple they may be, collectively form meaningful expressions of political power. From the perspective of Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory, these activities represent an expansion of the repertoire of contention into the digital sphere, where low-cost actions complement and extend conventional forms of political expression such as demonstrations and petitions [15].

The second and third categories, each accounting for eight posts or 26.7%, were political documentation and political satire. These categories reflect two distinct yet complementary communication strategies within the

movement. Political documentation functions as an archival resource that provides factual evidence of protest events and policy developments, supporting the movement's claims of worthiness, one of the four WUNC criteria identified by Tilly [15] as necessary for movements to gain public and institutional legitimacy. Political satire, on the other hand, serves a different strategic function by packaging political criticism through humor and creative expression. Satirical content reduces the psychological and social costs of engaging with political issues, thereby broadening the movement's participatory base beyond those who are already politically motivated.

Overall, the #ResetIndonesia movement successfully fulfilled all four WUNC criteria identified by Tilly [15] as requirements for social movement legitimacy. Worthiness was reflected in the use of respectable symbols, namely Hero Green to represent worker solidarity and Brave Pink to represent women, communicating that the movement's demands were grounded in legitimate moral values [6]. Unity was demonstrated through the consistent use of the #ResetIndonesia hashtag and the 17+8 template as unifying symbols across all content. Numbers were evidenced by the massive volume of engagement, including more than 9 million views on a single Reels post, indicating public support on a scale that could not be ignored. Commitment was reflected in the movement's sustainability across several phases, from digital expression to physical demonstrations and ultimately to the institutional response of the DPR RI on September 5, 2025 [30].

These findings reveal both similarities and differences with the study by Ulya and Indainanto [21] on the #TolakRUUKesehatan movement on Twitter. Both movements demonstrate the dominance of affective expression as the most common form of participation. However, unlike #TolakRUUKesehatan, which was driven by opinion leaders from activist groups and professional organizations, #ResetIndonesia shows that affective expression can be mobilized on a massive scale by non-political public figures, indicating an expansion of the repertoire of mobilizing actors that has not yet been fully conceptualized in the existing literature.

Thus, these findings extend the typology proposed by Theocharis and Van Deth [18] by demonstrating that, within the context of visual platforms such as Instagram, affective expression and satire—not merely conventional expressive actions—function as legitimate and strategic forms of political participation.

B. The Process of Political Participation Mobilization in Society

The mobilization process within the #ResetIndonesia movement can be comprehensively analyzed through Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory by identifying five categories of resources strategically deployed by movement actors. The first category is technological resources. The movement initiators consciously selected Instagram as the primary platform based on their familiarity with its features and their previous experience using it for public communication. As one initiator explained, "Honestly, we chose Instagram

because we were active users of the platform. At that time, we also used the Live feature to directly receive public aspirations" (I-1, Interview, May 14, 2026). This statement reveals that Instagram was not chosen arbitrarily; rather, it reflected a strategic assessment of the platform's capacity to facilitate large-scale two-way communication, a form of resource awareness that Tilly [15] identifies as a foundation of effective mobilization. In this context, Instagram features such as Live, Reels, Stories, and repost functions served as technological resources that actively supported information dissemination and movement organization [9].

The second category is network resources. The dissemination of the 17+8 visual template relied heavily on influencer networks, whose large follower bases enabled the movement's message to spread exponentially across various online communities. Within Tilly's framework, these influencers functioned as actors with privileged access to public communication arenas, whose participation dramatically expanded the movement's reach without requiring the construction of new communication infrastructure from scratch.

The third category is symbolic resources. The movement developed a cohesive visual identity through the consistent use of colors, namely "Hero Green," representing working-class solidarity, and "Brave Pink," representing women's political participation, alongside the 17+8 template and the #ResetIndonesia hashtag itself [6]. The repeated circulation of these symbols across Instagram posts, Stories, and Reels strengthened collective identification among participants and signaled the movement's unity and worthiness to external audiences [13].

The fourth category is organizational resources, which proved to be the most critical determinant of whether online participation was converted into offline collective action. Both initiators and hybrid participants consistently stated that Instagram alone was insufficient to mobilize street demonstrations. As one initiator explained, "Social media is only a tool. The scale of the action still depends on how well organizations or community groups are able to consolidate" (H-2, Interview, April 21, 2026). Although Tilly [15] formulated his theory in the context of pre-digital social movements, his core proposition regarding the indispensability of organizational resources remains highly relevant in the platform era. The presence of Instagram as a powerful technological resource does not alter the fact that high-cost collective actions in this case, physical demonstrations still require organizational coordination that cannot be provided by digital platforms alone. This finding further demonstrates that Resource Mobilization Theory possesses predictive power that extends beyond the historical context in which it was originally developed.

The mobilization process within the #ResetIndonesia movement unfolded through several interconnected stages, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3 presents a flowchart of the mobilization process developed by the researcher based on the results of netnographic analysis and in-depth interviews. As shown in Figure X, the mobilization process within the #ResetIndonesia movement unfolded through several interconnected stages. Mobilization began with the

emergence of public dissatisfaction regarding the policy of increasing DPR allowances, which prompted the initiators to establish the #ResetIndonesia movement. In the next stage, Instagram was selected as the primary mobilization medium because of its broad reach and features that support public interaction. The use of the 17+8 visual template and Instagram Live sessions then became the main instruments for disseminating the movement's demands and building collective awareness.




Fig 3. Flowchart of the Mobilization Process

Once the movement's message had spread, the process advanced to the stage of online organization through information dissemination, user interaction, and influencer involvement, which further expanded the movement's reach. The final stage was marked by efforts to convert digital participation into offline collective action through the support of communities and organizations that provided coordination and mobilization networks. Thus, the mobilization process demonstrates that the success of the movement depended not only on information dissemination through digital platforms but also on the ability to continuously connect technological, network, symbolic, and organizational resources.

Overall, these findings confirm the relevance of Resource Mobilization Theory in the digital context while extending the framework by incorporating technological and symbolic resources as categories that should be considered in the analysis of contemporary social movement mobilization.

C. The Dynamics of Hybrid Participation in Society

The findings regarding the dynamics of hybrid participation both confirm and critically extend the framework proposed by Gibson and Cantijoch [19]. Instagram clearly functions as a low-cost participation space, enabling users to engage politically through simple actions that do not require significant investments of time, financial resources, or physical risk. The diversity of motivations for online participation among the informants illustrates this dynamic.

One online participant explained their decision not to join offline demonstrations due to physical safety concerns: "At that time, I was afraid that things might turn violent. I'm a woman, and my parents also did not allow me to go" (O-2, Interview, April 22, 2026). Another informant cited practical constraints: "Because I work, I do not have free time to participate in street demonstrations" (O-1, Interview, April 23, 2026). These responses reveal that the barriers preventing offline participation—physical risk, parental restrictions, and time constraints—are precisely the obstacles that can be overcome through digital participation, confirming Gibson and Cantijoch's [19] argument that online and offline participation occupy different positions along the participation-cost continuum.

However, the most theoretically significant finding lies in the non-linearity of the transition from online to offline participation. Hybrid participants and initiators consistently indicated that their decision to join street demonstrations was not driven by Instagram content alone but required mediation through communities and organizations. As one initiator stated, "Instagram is effective for raising awareness. It can make people quickly aware of an issue, but for real action we still need communities, further discussions, and concrete steps in the offline world. Social media is only the entry point, not the final destination" (I-1, Interview, May 14, 2026). This finding challenges the implicit assumption of linearity within Gibson and Cantijoch's model, which suggests that sufficient online engagement will naturally evolve into offline action. The #ResetIndonesia case demonstrates that such escalation is structurally mediated rather than platform-driven [19].

The findings regarding the non-linearity of the online-offline transition have theoretical implications that extend beyond the #ResetIndonesia case. Gibson and Cantijoch's [19] hybrid participation model implicitly assumes that sufficient online engagement will naturally encourage escalation into offline participation, reflecting an optimistic view of the capacity of digital platforms to serve as catalysts for collective action. However, the findings of this study suggest that this assumption oversimplifies the dynamics that actually occur. The transition from digital participation to physical action is not determined solely by the volume or intensity of online engagement but rather by the availability of mediating structures, namely communities and organizations, that are capable of converting digital support into concrete action coordination.

In this regard, the study contributes to the development of the hybrid participation concept by introducing a structural dimension that has received relatively little attention. The hybridity of participation is not merely a matter of technological availability but also of the availability of social networks capable of bridging the online and offline spheres. Similar findings were reported by Bahriansyah et al. (2025) in the context of the Indonesia Gelap Movement 2025, where digital mobilization was found to be reactive and did not always result in sustained collective action without the support of established organizational networks.

At the same time, the findings reveal that Instagram played a meaningful role in maintaining connections between online and offline spaces after demonstrations had taken place. One hybrid participant noted, "Demonstration documentation can

be uploaded to Instagram Stories and Reels, so online and offline support become connected” (H-1, Interview, April 20, 2026). This observation confirms the cyclical nature of hybrid participation. Rather than moving in a one-way direction from online to offline, the #ResetIndonesia movement demonstrates a continuous loop in which digital and physical spaces mutually reinforce one another. In Tilly’s terminology, Instagram functions as an amplification infrastructure that expands the visibility and legitimacy of offline actions, while communities and organizations provide the organizational resources necessary to sustain collective action beyond the digital sphere.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the forms and processes of political participation mobilization on Instagram through the #ResetIndonesia movement in 2025. Based on a netnographic analysis of 30 Instagram posts and interviews with six informants, the findings indicate that the most dominant forms of participation were expressions of public dissatisfaction and anger through comments, post sharing, and Instagram Stories. These findings are consistent with Theoharis and Van Deth’s [18] concept of online expressive political participation, which recognizes digital activities as meaningful forms of political participation. The mobilization process was carried out through five key resources: technological, network, symbolic, organizational, and human resources, as explained in Tilly’s Resource Mobilization Theory [15]. The main finding demonstrates that the transition from digital participation to offline action does not occur automatically but requires the involvement of communities and organizations beyond the platform. Theoretically, this study extends the relevance of Tilly’s theory to the digital context and enriches Gibson and Cantijoch’s [19] concept of hybrid participation by demonstrating that the hybridity of participation is mediated by organizational structures rather than technology alone. Practically, these findings highlight that social movements need to combine the use of Instagram with the strengthening of community and organizational networks as a foundation for offline mobilization. This study has several limitations, including its exclusive focus on Instagram, the limited number of informants, and the absence of intercoder validation. Therefore, future research is encouraged to conduct cross-platform studies, improve the reliability of content analysis, and examine the long-term impact of digital mobilization on policy change and the responsiveness of state institutions.

REFERENCES

[1] A. R. A. Kumara, "Apa Arti Hashtag Reset Indonesia?" IDN Times, Sep. 10, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://www.idntimes.com/life/inspiration/apa-arti-hashtag-reset-indonesia-00-98756-bq2nvs>

[2] Reuters Staff, "Indonesian Police Clash with Protesters against Parliamentarians' Salaries," Reuters, Aug. 25, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesian-police-clash-with-protesters-against-parliamentarians-salaries-2025-08-25/>

[3] N. P. Bestari, "Kronologi Demo 25–29 Agustus: Demo DPR Melebar Jadi Amarah ke Polisi," CNBC Indonesia, Aug. 30, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/202508301457264662882/kronologi-demo-25-29-agustus-demo-dpr-melebar-jadi-amarah-ke-polisi>

[4] Radar Solo, "Tagar Reset Indonesia Menggema di Media Sosial, Apa Artinya dan Siapa yang Dimaksud?" RadarSolo.com, Sep. 2, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://radarsolo.jawapos.com/nasional/846519899/tagar-reset-indonesia-menggema-di-media-sosial-apa-artinya-dan-siapa-yang-dimaksud>

[5] D. Harff and D. Schmuck, "Is Authenticity Key? Mobilization by Social Media Influencers versus Celebrities and Young People's Political Participation," *Psychology & Marketing*, vol. 41, no. 11, pp. 2757–2771, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.22082>

[6] K. Meilina, "Viral Tagar #ResetIndonesia, Apa Maknanya?" Katadata.co.id, Sep. 3, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://katadata.co.id/digital/teknologi/68b7a59db2f57/viral-tagar-resetindonesia-apa-maknanya>

[7] E. Trikarinaputri and D. Ernis, "Fakta-Fakta Demo 1 September di DPR," Tempo, Sep. 2, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://www.tempo.co/politik/fakta-fakta-demo-1-september-di-dpr-2065697>

[8] E. Hale, "Hong Kong Protests: Tech War Opens Up with Doxxing of Protesters and Police," *The Guardian*, Sep. 20, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/20/hong-kong-protests-tech-war-opens-up-with-doxxing-of-protesters-and-police>

[9] A. Virlinda and D. A. Candraningrum, "Peran Instagram Reels dalam Strategi Digital Public Relations Event Megabuild 2025," *Kiwari*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 107–117, Mar. 2026. <https://doi.org/10.24912/ki.v5i1.37004>

[10] GoodStats, "Simak Tren Pengguna Instagram di Indonesia 2018–2025," Sep. 10, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://data.goodstats.id/statistic/simak-tren-pengguna-instagram-di-indonesia-2018-2025-DfC>

[11] DataReportal, *Digital 2026: Indonesia*. Kepios, 2026. [Online]. Available: <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2026-indonesia>

[12] NapoleonCat, *Instagram Users in Indonesia*, Sep. 10, 2025. [Online]. Available:

- <https://napoleoncat.com/stats/instagram-users-in-indonesia/>
- [13] Y. Theocharis, S. Boulianne, K. Koc-Michalska, and B. Bimber, "Platform Affordances and Political Participation: How Social Media Reshape Political Engagement," *West European Politics*, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 788–811, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2087410>
- [14] Kompas, "Perjalanan 17+8 Tuntutan Rakyat, dari Diskusi Influencer sampai Respons DPR RI dan TNI," Kompas.com, Sep. 6, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2025/09/06/093000065/perjalanan-17-8-tuntutan-rakyat-dari-diskusi-influencer-sampai-respons-dpr>
- [15] C. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
- [16] J. Van Stekelenburg and B. Klandermans, "The social psychology of protest," *Current Sociology*, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 3–22, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921221134564>
- [17] J. Earl and K. Kimport, *Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2021.
- [18] Y. Theocharis and J. W. van Deth, *The Meaning of Political Participation Across Times and Spaces*. Routledge, 2018.
- [19] R. Gibson and M. Cantijoch, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Participation in the Age of the Internet: Is Online Political Engagement Really Different from Offline?" *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 701–716, 2013.
- [20] U. Klinger and J. Svensson, "The platformization of politics: How digital platforms shape political participation," *Information, Communication & Society*, vol. 24, no. 9, pp. 1239–1255, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1971974>
- [21] H. Ulya and Y. Indainanto, "Mobilisasi Gerakan Opini Digital #TolakRUUKesehatan di Media Sosial," *Jurnal Communio: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 146–156, 2024.
- [22] M. I. Bahriansyah, S. Anriani, Mulyadi, I. Subono, and P. Nurisnaeny, "Mobilisasi Partisipasi Politik Generasi Z dalam Aksi Indonesia Gelap 2025," *JMPIS: Jurnal Manajemen Pendidikan Ilmu Sosial*, vol. 6, no. 5, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.38035/jmpis.v6i5>
- [23] J. W. Creswell and J. D. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 5th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018.
- [24] R. V. Kozinets, *Netnography: The Essential Guide to Qualitative Social Media Research*, 3rd ed. London: SAGE Publications, 2020.
- [25] O. Robinson, "Probing in Qualitative Research Interviews: Theory and Practice," *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 382–397, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2023.2238625>
- [26] M. B. Miles, A. M. Huberman, and J. Saldaña, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*, 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014.
- [27] DataReportal, *Digital 2025: Indonesia*. Kepios, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-indonesia>
- [28] W. M. Lim, "What Is Qualitative Research? An Overview and Guidelines," *Australasian Marketing Journal*, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 199–229, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14413582241264619>
- [29] Eriyanto, *Metode Netnografi: Pendekatan Kualitatif dalam Memahami Budaya Pengguna Media Sosial*. Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, 2021.
- [30] DPR RI [@dpr_ri], "Langkah Konkret DPR RI Jawab Tuntutan Rakyat," Instagram, Sep. 5, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://www.instagram.com/p/DOOm-zgE1zC/>
- [31] Wandu, "DPR RI Umumkan Enam Keputusan, Tanggapi 17+8 Tuntutan Rakyat," *InfoPublik*, Sep. 6, 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://infopublik.id/kategori/nasional-politik-hukum/936557/dpr-ri-umumkan-enam-keputusan-tanggapi-17-8-tuntutan-rakyat>